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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 




E. I. WILSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE 
NO. 9887 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action against a buyer for recovery of the 
purchase price of goods purchased from the plaintiff, 
wherein defendant answered and admitted purehase of 
the goods, but in addition counterclaimed fm- alleged ibreadl 
of both e~ess and implied warranties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment awarding plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and 
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awarding defendant damages upon hi:S counterclaim, plain-
tiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment on the coun-
terclaim and judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or 
that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
E. I. Wilson, at the time thi:S action was initiated and 
for many years prior thereto, was a resident of Nephi, 
Juab County, Utah. Mr. Wilson had been in the turkey 
business approximately twelve years in December of 1957. 
During that time he had raised from 50,000 to 170,000 
turkeys a year. 
In the fall of 1957, Mr. Wilson designed a turkey 
brooder coop that would be approximately 400 to 450 feet 
long by 40 feet wide. He wanted a coop that was large 
enough to handle 25,000 to 30,000 poults. In the fall of 
that year, approximately November or December, there 
was a turkey show held in Salt Lake City. All the man-
ufacturers of turkey equipment sent a manufacturer's rep-
resentative and framed displays of their products. James 
Manufacturing Company had a display of turkey feeder 
units and ventilator systems. Mr. Ray Tuttle was the fac-
tory representative. Mr. Wilson had occasion to see the 
exhibit of James Manufacturing Company and was es-
peeially interested in the ventilating system and feeder 
units. As a result of this exhibit, he contacted Mr. Tuttle 
in Mr. Tuttle's motel in Salt Lake City. Mr. Wilson ex-
plained what he anticipated in the way of construction and 
what 'his needs would be. He also stated that he had seen 
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a sample of the auger feeding unit, (which is the subject 
of this lawsuit), in operation at the exhibit and thought 
that it would serve his purposes. He and Mr. Tuttle sat 
down at the desk and discussed the ventilator system and 
drew some rough sketches, which Mr. Wilson took with 
him. 
From 1952 to 1958 Mr. Wilson dealt with Utah Poultry 
and Farmers Co-operative. Utah Ploultry and Farmers 
Co-operative was a dealer for James Manufacturing Com-
pany and sold products under the trade name of James 
Manufacturing Company, to-wit: "Jamesway." Mr. Wil-
son, both before and after the purchase of tJhe equipment, 
which is the subject of this suit, bought J ame1sway equip-
ment from Utah Poultry and Farmers Oo~-operative. 
On January 8, 1958, Mr. Wilson arranged to purchase 
from Utah Poultry 'and Farmers Co-operative eight 26 inch 
ceiling fans with thermostats and K-D Stimaline ventilators. 
This purchase was signed on January 8, 19,58, under a pur-
chase order and eontract of Utah Poultry and Farmers 
Co-operative (Exhibit P.15). Utah Poultry and Farmers 
Co-operative took their usual markup and placed the order 
for this equipment with James Manufacturing Cornany. 
The equipment was delivered to E. I. Wilson at Nephi, 
Utah, from the warehouse and office of Utah Poultry and 
Farmers Co-operative in Nephi, Utah, on Utah Poultry 
Company trucks. 
Later on February 21, 1958, Mr. Wilson met in the 
office of Utaih Poultry Company with Mr. Tuttle, Mr. Arza 
Adams, an officer and director of Utah Poultry, a Mr. Hop-
kinson, the purchasing ~agent fm- Utah Poultry, and a Mr. 
Woods, who was sales manager foc Utah Poultry. At that 
time a conversation was had concerning the purchase olf 
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these feeder units and whether they would be satisfactory 
for young poults because of the size of the troughs. MT. 
Adams and Mr. Tuttle informed Mr. Wilson that they 
thought the trough was too large and that this equipment 
would not be suitable foc young poults and Mr. Wilson 
felt that he could build a ramp up to the trough and that 
it would be satisfactocy. Mr. Wilson denied this conver-
sation and claims that it never took place, however, Mr. 
Tuttle, Mr. Adamson and Mr. Adams all testified to the 
circumstance and conversation. In any event on Febru-
ary 21, 1958, Mr. Wilson placed an order for 800 feet of 
auger turkey feeders with the Utah Poultry and Farmers 
Co-operative. This order was placed upon the contract 
form of Utah Boultry and Farmers Co-operative (Em1:bit 
P.15-secnnd page). Utah Poultry and Farmers ~­
erative ordered the units from Jamesway and they were 
delivered throogh Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-operative 
to E. I. Wilson. It is the contention of Mr. E. I. Wilson 
that Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-operative was merely 
the financing agent of E. I. Wilson and that the sales were 
actually made by James Manufacturing Company. 
Mr. Wilson built the turkey brooder coop and installed 
the ventilator system himself. Prior to the first brood 
turkeys arriving from the hatchery, Mr. Wilson started 
the installation of the turkey feeder units. This he was 
doing himself. The turkeys arrived at a time when one-
half of the turkey feeder units, to-wit: 400 feet, had been 
installed on the south side of the coop. The other 400 feet 
for the north side was never installed. These turkey feeder 
units did not work to the satisfaction of Mr. Wilson. He 
called James Manufacturing Company at Los Angeles and 
requested their assistance in the installation of the turkey 
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feeder units and they sent Mr. P&sig, an engineer, and 
helpers from Los Angeles to help correct the defect that 
Mr. Wilson was complaining of. His complaint was that 
the auger would not convey the feed more than fifty feet 
from the hopper when, in fact, to operate effectively it 
had to convey it 400 feet through the trough. Mr. Tuttle 
testified that be·fore the engineer and ICrew left they had 
the auger working satisfactorily and conveying feed 400 
feet. Mr. Wilson denied that they ever got it operating 
effectively and testified that they left before it was op&-
ating to his satisfaction. 
Mr. Wilson testified. that he found that the feeder unit 
would not satisfactoruy feed young poults, that they woruld 
fall in the trough and could not get out, and that the feed 
could not be •conveyed effectively the 400 feet and for that 
reason he removed the feeder units then installed, did nort 
install the other 400 feet, and took the feeder units and 
re-installed them in 200 feet sections in his yard ibr the 
use of his range turkeys of a larger size. Mr. Tuttle tes-
tified that the reason 1Jhey were removed was that they 
were never designed for young poults and that Mr. Wilson 
discovered soon after he had attempted to operate one of 
them that the trough was too large for young porults and 
that they could not reach from the outside without place-
ment of two by forur planking along the outside fror them 
to stand on and that they would fall in the trough and could 
not get out and that he had been so advised before he pur-
chased the feeder units. In any event, the feeder units were 
re-installed by Mr. Wilson in 1hls yard and used by him to 
the present time in his range yard. 
Mr. Wilson replaced the auger feeder units in the coop 
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with overhead feeder units manufactured by the Steve Re-
gan Company. 
After Mr. Wilson discovered the alleged defect in the 
auger feeder units, he was contacted by Mr. Ray Tuttle, 
the manufacturer's representative for James Manufactur-
ing Company, at his turkey ranch in Nephi, Utah. This 
was on or abOIUt March 10, 1958. At this time no complaint 
or mention of the defects in either the ventilator system 
or the turkey feeder units was made to Mr. Tuttle. Mr. 
Wilson, on the contrary, wanted to purchase seventy-five 
10 foot turkey feeders of a range type. These are barrel 
type units with trays on the bottom that axe placed in the 
open range :for turkeys approaching maturity. Mr. Wilson 
asked Mr. Tuttle if James Manufacturing Company would 
sell these units to 'him direct and finance the units for him. 
Mr. Tuttle contacted his employer by phone ·and got the 
authorization and sold these seventy-five turkey feeders 
directly to Mr. Wilson for $5,250.00 on a contract (Exhibit 
D-10). Mr. Wilson did not pay for the seventy-five turkey 
feeders. The plaintiff, by numeroll.lS letteTS, attempted to 
get its financing contracts signed and paid. See Exhibits 
P-1 dated April 8, 1958; P-2 dated April22, 1958; P-3 dated 
May 28, 1958; defendant's letter to plaintiff P-4 dated Oc-
tober 2, 1958; P-5 dated November 5, 1958; P-6 dated De-
cemlber 9, 1958; P-7 dated January 29, 1959. Mr. Wilson, 
instead of paying the contracts, requested refinancing which 
was granted on two different occasions (E)chibits P-5, P-14). 
After no results were received from the above letters, 
Mr. Mark Adamson, Jamesway's Utah territory man, ob· 
tained a refinancing note and contract (Emibit P.14) from 
Mr. Wilson after contacting ·him personally in Nephi. The 
original oontraJct called for payments as follows: Exhibit 
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D-10) $1,000.00 June 15, 1958; $1,000.00 September 15, 
1958;$3,250.00 March 15, 1959. These payments were ad-
justed on February 18, 1959 (Exhibit P.14) to provide for 
payments as follows; $1,000.00 on March 15 ,1959; $1,000.00 
June 15, 1959; and $3,250.00 on September 15, 1959. Mr. 
Adamson testified no {)Totest or complaint was made 1n him 
at the time of the execution of the refinancing contract. 
Neither did he, in any of his lett~s up to the letter of March 
16, 1959, (Exhibit P-8) make any complaint nor did he 
request any off -set or discount because of alleged defects in 
the ventilator system or the auger feeder units. The James 
Manufacturing Company did, however, at Mr. Wilson's 
request, extend the payment one year. 
Eventually, in June of 19,59, after no payments had 
been made, the plaintiff requested payment or the rerturn 
of the merchandise, and Mr. Wilson refused 'and the plain-
tiff instituted this action to repossess the turkey feeders. 
Upon filing the action the plaintiff repossessed the equip-
ment on a writ of replevin and resold it, and the defend-
ant filed a counterclaim asking for damages because of al-
leged defects and breach of warranties in the sale of the 
eight 26 inch ceiling fans with K-D Stimaline ventilatocs, 
and in the automatic feeders, auger type. The plaintiff 
contends that neither items were sold by it, but were sold, 
in fact, by Utalh Pountry and Farmers Co~orperative and 
that there was not, in fact, any breach of warranty under 
either item. 
Testimony was elicited concerning the number of tur-
keys that died from the period 1958 through 1959 and tes-
timony was obtained from Dr. ~alA. Bagley, a veterin-
nary who was on call by Mr. Wilson during this period, that 
the turkeys died from various causes of an epedemic pro-
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portion, such as paratyphoid, sulfaquinoxaline poisoning 
(over-medication), air sack lesion, vent pi,cking, cholera, 
Newcastle Disease, cerebral hemorage, cannabilism, blue 
coomb ( a virus infection), and many other causes that 
would nort be related to drafts or ventilating. Mr. Wilson 
put on testimony eoncerning drafts and temperature vari-
ations that, in his opinion, ·caused the death of the turkeys. 
This fact situation is mentioned only insofar as it affects 
the plaintiff's motion for a new trial based upon newly dis-
covered testimony. There was no dispute on the plain-
tiff's complaint except as to the amount of attorneys fee 
and the case was tried on the defendant's counterclaim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE JURY 
TRIAL OVER THIE OBJECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
The record will disclose that a demand for trial was 
made by the plaintiff. The demand for trial was on a 
standard form and requested a non-jury trial (R. 113). 
Both plaintiff and defendant appeared at the pretrial con-
ference at 10:00 A. M. on the 27th day of August, 1962. 
At thast time the plaintiff appeared by and through Jack-
son B. Howard and the defendant appeared by and through 
W. Eugene Hansen. Matters were set down in ·the pretrial 
order and the Court instructed the plaintiff to prepare rthe 
pretrial order. The pretrial order was prepared in con-
formity to the Court's instruction and the matter was set 
for trial without a jury and the estimate of time of trial was 
two days based upon a non-jury setting. The date of the 
said trial was to ~commence on the 30th day of October, 
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1962. On the late afternoon of Octoiber 24, 1962, counsel 
for the plaintiff called counsel for the defendant to discuss 
the stipuations that might be entered into in order to ex-
pedite the trial. At that time the defendant informed the 
plaintiff that it was his belief that the trial would be a jury 
trial. Counsel for the plaintiff informed counsel for the 
defendant he was not prepared for such a trial and that he 
would contact the Court concerning it. Because of Court 
commitments in Richfield on the 25th, the plaintiff had no 
opportunity to review the file or consult with the Court 
until the 26th of October, at which time plaintiff talked 
to the Court by phone concerning the jury trial. The file 
discloses that the only request for jury trial was in a let-
ter from the defendant's attorney dated September 11, 1962, 
addressed to the HonoTable C. Nelson Day, Judge, Fifth 
Judicial District, Manti, Utah, a cwbon copy of whioh was 
sent to the office of the plaintiff's attorney. That letter 
is not part of the recocd but is set out as follows: 
"September 11, 1962 
Honocable C. Nelson Day, Judge 
Fifth Judicial District 
Manti, Utah 
Re: James Manufacturing vs. Ernest Wilson 
Civil No. 3937 
Dear Judge Day: 
I recently received a copy of the Pretrial Order. 
I had expected that Jackson would mail a copy to us 
for approval before it was signed ;however, I note he 
submitted it directly to the Court foc signature. 
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I had written Jackson before receiving the! Pr~ 
trial Order indicating that Arthur had an additional 
issue he wanted included in the Order ooncerning the 
sale of the turkey feeders as set forth in Plaintiff's 
Complaint. The issue being whether or not they ob-
tained the reasonable value of the feeders on their 
repossession sale. 
Arthur is in Washington, D.C. at the present time 
and I hesitate filing a motion and setting it up for 
argument on a point which is relatively mino[' until 
such time as he returns and either works out the mat-
ter upon stipulation with Jackson oc personally decides 
to notice it up for hearing. 
I am therefore sending this letter in hopes that 
this one phase of the Pretrial Order mig1ht remain open 
until Arthurs return. I also mailed a check to the 
Clerk yesterday to cover the jury fees in the case since 
it was requested by the client. 
Sincerely yours, 
W. Eugene Hansen 
WEH:bt 
cc: Jackson Hloward, Attorney" 
The very last paragraph is the only reference to a jury 
trial setting ever made by the defendant and it is merelY 
a statement that "I mailed a check to the Clerk yeste!I'day 
to oover the jury fee in the case since it was requested by 
the client." Although it is not a tribute to rounsel for the 
plaintiff, nevertheless, this particular sentence was over-
looked inasmuch as the substance of the letter was that 
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Mr. Nielsen would be back from Washington and would be 
in contact with the Court and counsel for the plaintiff when 
he returned. Based upon the assumption that the trial 
would not be of a jury nature, ·counsel did not have an 
opportunity to review the panel, could not determine the 
background of the jurors and was prohibited from obtain-
ing a new panel under provision 78-46-23. The Court ad-
vised counsel for the plaintiff om Octobe·r 26th that he was 
going to order the Clerk to secure a jury. Octoiber 26, 
1962, was the Friday prior to trial, which was Tuesday, 
October 30th. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff was 
denied an opportunity to properly analyze the jury panel 
and, consequently, was forced to select a jury at a con-
siderable handicap. Plaintiff was also prrevented from re-
questing a postponement of trial because subpoenas had 
been sent to numerous witnesses, witness fees paid, and 
one witness was enroute from Los Ange~es. 
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the Court 
should have refused to grant a jury trial. The plaintiff 
contends that no proper demand for a jury trial was made 
in accordance with law. Article I, Section 2, of the Utah 
Constitutiern states "a jury in civil cases shall be waived 
unless demanded." Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure states that a jury trial can be obtained by demand 
and defines what demand is under the Constitution. Rule 
38(b) states: 
"b. Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury 
of any issue triable of right by jury by paying the 
statutocy jury fee and se:rving upon the other parties 
a demand therefor in writing at any time after the 
commencement of the action and nort later than shall 
be fixed by rule of the oourt in whiCh the action is 
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pending. Such demand may be endorsed upon a plead 
ing of the party." 
No demand was made in conformity with Rule 38(b; 
of the Utah Rules ill Civil Procedure and the defendan· 
does not contend that one was. The Fifth Judicial DistriCI 
Court apparently has no rule governing this procedure 
Inquiry was made both of the Court and the Clerk concern 
ing the rule fixed by the Court concerning such demand 
and none was available and the Court informed the plain· 
tiff's counsel that it had not established rules. Under thesE 
circumstances, it is respectfully urged that to compel the 
plaintiff to submit to a jury trial on a notice as late as Oc-
tober 26, 1962, was prejudicial and an infringement of its 
rights. 
POINT IT 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING ALL WIT· 
NESSES FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND DENYING THE 
PLAINTIFF A RIGHT TO HAVE ITS COUNSEL AS-
SISTED BY ANY WITNESSES FOR A SUBSTANTIAL 
PART OF THE TRIAL. 
The record will disclose that the case was called for 
trial on 'fuesday, October 30, 1962, at the hour of 10:00 
A.M. The first order of business, after hearing the mo-
tions of the plaintiff to strike the jury trial, was the se-
lection of the jury. After the jury was selected and prior 
to argument of counsel, plaintiff invoked the exclusion rule 
(Tr. P.3,L.17). This motion was made at approximately 
1:30 P.M., prior to defendant's opening statement to the 
jury. Each party indicated who their witnesses were to 
be and the witnesses were sworn, however, at that stage 
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Mr. Nielsen, Attorney for the defendant, argued to the 
Cow1: that plaintiff was not entitled to have anyone assist 
counsel if it invoked the rule because the plaintiff was a 
corporate entity. It was Mr. Nielsen's contention that a 
corporate entity can only be represented by its principal 
officers and that counsel for a covporate entity can retain 
with him as an assistant during the eourse of the trial only 
a corporate officer who stands in the stead of the corporate 
entity. This was contrary to/ the plaintiff's: view of the 
case and plaintiff elected to stand by its motion to exclude 
witnesses. 
On the basis of the arguments which were strenuous 
and heated and cover pages 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the transcript, 
1Jhe Court ruled that Mr. Tuttle, the witness chosen by the 
plaintiff to assist counsel, would he excluded. From that 
period of time, approximate,ly 1:30 P.M., until late in the 
afternoon of the first day of trial, OctOber 30, 1962, the 
plaintiff was compelled to conduct the trial of the matter 
without the asistance of its key wi1ness, while the defend-
ant was allowed to remain in the courtroom all during the 
course of the arguments and trial. 
On the eonclusion of the defendant's opening state-
ment, during which time all of the wi1nesses for the plain-
tiff, including Mr. Tuttle, were absent from the courtroom, 
the plaintiff again reiterated its motion and oibjection to 
the Court's sequestration of its witnesses (Tr. P.8, L. 30 
and P.10, L. 20): 
"MR. HOWARD: ,May it please the Court and jury, 
we would prefer to reserve our argument until the defend-
ant is 1Jhrot1g1h with their case in chief. NO!W, your Honor, 
I am reluctant to press an issue the Court has ruled upon 
because I believe it is a matter of prejudicial error. I think 
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it is important to infmm the Court that unless my client 
is allowed to be represented by a representative they are 
deprived of their rights because the law says that a party 
may attend the Court; and the rule does nort apply to a 
party. Now, if Mr. N[elson's argument is sound, the only 
person who could be a party in a -corporate action would 
be the president, probably, or some officer. Now, if you 
get the situation were you have a corporate party, that 
corporate party may be present by any representative it 
chooses to have present, and the attorney for the plain-
tiff is me; and I elect to have Mr. Tuttle here. Otherwise, 
my client is deprived of the right to be present at this trial 
even thou~h the defendant who is a party is present, whlch 
is a gross lack of neutrality in the trial of this case. Other-
wise, the corporate client cannot be present because a cor-
poration is an artificial being, there's no personage, fuere's 
no party except insofar as it is represented by represen-
tatives. 
So I say Mr. Tuttle is their representative, He's the 
one that has knowledge of this situation. He's the one 
they have selected to be present. He's the one who must 
be present. Yoru take a corporation like United States Steel, 
the president and officers have no dealings generally wi1Jh 
any of the transactions. They could never be present in 
Court except by counsel. 
MR. NIELSON: I submit to the Court that Mr. How-
ard made a fine statement in front of the jury about his 
client brut there's nothing wrong with ·the president or any 
officer or managing agent of the corporation being pNS-
ent, but he's asked for a salesman to be in here. The cor-
poration doesn't have to be here if it doesn't want to he 
here; but if they want to be here badly enough, then, whY 
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doesn't one of the officers or managing agent of the cor-
poration be here? If Mr. Wilson doesn't want to be here, 
he doesn't have to be here. But if he wants to be here, 
he has got to be here. 
MR. HOWARD: The question answers itself, your 
Honor. I am sure I can find authorities on that subject. 
I have researched it before and I am confident tlhat they 
can be present by who they choose. The state has the same 
privilege. They are not a being. The exception to the 
rule is the one person they elect to be present for them. 
THE COURT: I have already ruled on the matter. 
I'm going to let that ruling stand unless and until you 
show me something more than you have." 
. The trial then commenced and Mr. Wilson was allowed 
to testify. Mr. Wilson, the defendant, testified for o~er 
an hour before the Court took its afternoon recess. The 
testimony of Mr. Wilson during the period in which all wit-
nesses for the plaintiff were excluded, ·concemed construc-
tion of the brooder coops; the number of trips he made 
to Salt Lake to the turkey shows, and where he saw the 
auger feeders in operation; the testimony concerning a 
paratyphoid outbreak in his brooder coop; testimony con-
cerning his knowledge of turkey operations; his acquain-
tance with the operations of George Harmon, Milt Har-
mon, Mr. McKay, Wendell Hansen, a Mr. Gardner, George 
H. Ostler and George T. Ostler; his testimony ·onncerning 
normal loss; testimony concerning his knowledge of James-
way, his discussions with Ray Tuttle at Covey's Motel. 
All of this testimony was elicited o~er the objection of the 
plaintiff outside of the presence of plaintiff's key witness. 
After the time of the Court's afternoon recess at ap-
proximately 3:00P.M., the plaintiff again reiterated its oib-
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jection to the e,xdusion of its witness (Tr. P. 11, L. 24-30). 
Counsel was allowed the opportunity to research in the 
library for approximately twenty minutes, wherupon 1Jhe 
Court reconvened at approximately 3:30 P.M. Page 12 
of the transcript shows what transpired after Court was 
reconvened: 
"THJE COURT: The record should show that we were 
delayed for a few minutes because Mr. Howard was using 
the library to look for some law. 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I would like to make 
a motion and perhaps counsel would prefer we do it outside 
of the jury. 
THE COURT: Let's not send the jury out again. 
Why don't you come up here to the bench and let's discuss 
this for just a minute? DISC:USSION between Court 
and counsel not reported.) 
THE COURT: 'rhe record should show that the Jury 
is in the box and I think we are prepared to go ahead. Mr. 
Nielson, you may proceed. 
MR. NIELSON: I would like the record to show my 
objection to Mr. Ray Tuttle being in the Courtroom after 
his counsel has invoked the exclusion rule and will state 
again I have no objection to Mr. Park Adamson, represen-
tative of the oompany being present if he wants his pres-
ent; but I object to his bringing into the room Mr. Ray 
Tuttle after he has invoked the exclusion rule. 
THE COURT: The record should show in that re-
gard that pending the recess Mr. Howard has exhibited to 
the Court a Supreme Court case in the State of Utah which 
in substance and effect provides that the Court within its 
discretion may permit a representative of the party to be 
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in 1Jhe Courtroom even though the exclusion rule has been 
invoked; and Mr. Howard has chosen Mr. Ray Tuttle and 
therefore the Court in its discretion has permitted him to 
return into the Courtroom. And your objection is denied 
at this point. 
1\ffi. HOWARD: Now, we will withdraw oor last ob-
jection to the testimony of this witness. 
THE OOURT: All right." 
Prior to Mr. Wilson testifying, an objection had been 
made to his testimony concerning transactions with plain-
tiff company oc any of its officers or agents and especially 
with Mr. Thttle at a time when Mr. Tuttle was not pres-
ent to assist counsel concerning the testimony. Foc that 
reason when Mr. Tuttle was allowed to re-enter the ·court-
room the plaintiff withdrew its objection to future testi-
mony of the defendant orf his transactions and negotiations 
with Mr. Tuttle. 
Although the Court 1changed its mind concerning the 
propriety of having witness for the plaintiff present to as-
sist counsel during the course o[ the trial, it is the position 
of the plaintiff that such ruling was too late to overcome 
the handicap inflicted upon the plaintiff by the absence 
of its witness during a material and substantial portion of 
the trial. Since Mr. Tuttle at no time had an opportunity 
to review the transcript or the testimony of Mr. Wilson 
during the time in which he was outside of the courtroom, 
it is impossible to tell whether erroo.eoiUS infocmation was 
elicited from Mr. Wilson and, therefore, the plaintiff was 
prevented from properly cross-examining ·Mr. Wilson con-
cerning the testimony that was elicited during 1Jhe absence 
of Mr. Thttle. 
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The Court has ruled upon this subject before in th~ 
case of Xenakis, et al vs. Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., 26~ 
P.2d 1007, which is a case whffi"ein a party injured in ru 
automobile accident brought suit against the defendan1 
Apparently the action concerned the alleged negligence o: 
the defendant's truck driven by one of its drivers. It wru 
the ~contention of the plaintiff that the court erred in grant 
ing their motion to exclude witnesses and yet permit~ 
the defendant's truck driver to remain in court during thE 
trial to assist counsel for the defendant. The ~oourt rulee 
on this issue as follows: 
"Where witnesses are excluded it is common practice 
to allow one witness having spedal knowledge of the 
facts to emain in the courtroom to advise with counsel 
concerning the progress and management o[ the trial. 
It is not mandatory that this be done, but the entire 
matter of exclusion of witnesses rests within the sound 
discretion of tJhe trial court and its action will not be 
disturbed in the absence of showing clear abuse. The 
record here shows that he expressly announced that 
the truck driver Mr. Thompson, could remain in the 
courtroom and no objection was voiced by the plain-
tiff." 
In this instance, the plaintiff contends that the failure 
of the ~court to allow Mr. Tuttle to remain in the oourtroom 
during the COIU1'se of the testimony of Mr. Wilson was a 
clear abuse of sound d.i.scrotion. Mr. Wilson's entire case 
rested on his alleged transactions with Mr. Tuttle. It 
was tlhe contention of Mr. Wilson that he purchased the 
ventilator and the feeders from James Manufacturing Com-
pany through their representative, Mr. Tuttle, and that the 
warranties for which he claimed a breach were made or-
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ally by Mr. Tuttle. To deny the plaintiff the right to have 
Mr. Tuttle present during the course of a substantial amount 
of Mr. Wilson's testimony was dearly prejudicial and an 
abuse of discretion. 
POINT ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT 8 
OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
The plaintiff's objection on this point is restricted to 
the plaintiff's alleged breach of warranty in respect to the 
auger type turkey feeders. It is the contention of the 
plaintiff that thoce could be no breach of warranty of the 
auger type feeder units for the follorwing reasons: 
1. The auger type feeder units w&e so~d to the de-
fendant by Utah Poultry and Farmers Oo-orperative and 
not the plaintiff. 
2. The defendant pwchased the auger feeder units 
based upon his observation of a sample. 
3. The buyer was an experienced turkey operator 
who ordered a particular piece of merchandise for !his own 
purposes. 
4. The defendant gave 1Jhe plaintiff no notice as re-
quired by law of an alleged claim of breach of warranty. 
5. The defendant is estopped from claiming breach 
of warranty because of his utilization and use of the said 
auger feeders. 
In respect to the question of whether plaintiff sold 
these auger feeders to the defendant, that matteT will be 
taken up in the subsequent argument. The plaintiff will 
address itself to the question of warranty and its relation-
ship to this exhibit. It is the contention of the plaintiff 
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that under the circumstances of this case, defendant is not 
entitled to daim a breach of warranty. 
The facts are that Mr. Wilson saw the particular feeder 
unit purohased at a display of the same by J amesway at 
the Utah Turkey Show in Salt Lake City in November or 
December of 1957. He was impressed by the operation of 
the sample unit installed at that show. Mr. Wilson con-
tacted Mr. Tuttle at his hotel ~oom in Salt Lake for the 
purpose of discussing both the auger feeder units and the 
ventilator system. Mr. Wilson was a man of great ex-
perience in the turkey raising field, having been in the busi-
ness for moce than twelve years and having raised 170,000 
turkeys the year preceding the purchase of the auger feeder 
units. He was well aware of the size of young poults and 
the mechanical limitations and advantages of the proposed 
feeder units. This he discussed with Mr. Tuttle in detail. 
The fact, although disputed, is that he discussed this mat-
ter :furtller with Mr. Tuttle, Mr. Adamson, Mr. Orvil Ad-
ams, Mr. Wood and Mr. Ifupkinson in the office olf Utah 
Poultry on or about the 26th day of February, 1958, and 
was advised that in their opinion this auger unit was too 
large for young poults. Mr. Wilson was of the rrrlnd that 
he could place two by four planks along the outside peri-
fecy of the trough in order that the young poults could 
stand on the planks and eat out of the trough supplied by 
the auger. He was advised by Mr. Adams, who is a tur-
key grower and a director of the Utah Poultry Company, 
and Mr. Tuttle that little turkeys might have difficulty 
eating out of the trough and that if they got in the trough 
they might have difficulty getting out. Wilson felt that 
there would be no difficulty in this regard and that he 
would be willing to take that chance. This testimonY is 
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substantiated by Mr. Wilson's own concern, as expressed in 
the record (Tr. P. 13, L. 23): 
"A. I told him t:Jhat I had examined tJhe sample feeder 
and I liked this feeder, ex!cept I thought it was a little too 
deep and I asked him if there was a possibility to make a 
smaller trough, one that wasn't so high; that I wanted to 
use this in my coop." 
It is obvious from this statement tJhat Mr. Wilson 
recognized the limited use of this type of feeder unit, but 
neverhlleless that he wanted it fm- his coop. Under those 
circumstances Mr. Wilson cannot rely upon an implied 
warranty that the auger feeder unit was not suitable for 
his purposes, as expressed to Mr. Tutle. Authorities in 
this regard are as foll01ws: 
Uniform Sales Act, Title 60-1-15, Sub. Sec. 3 is as 
follows: 
"If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no im-
plied warranty as regards defects which such exam-
ination ought to have revealed." 
Under these circumstances, where he has examined 
the goods, and is cognizant of their construction, he can-
not complaint that the goods were not suitaJble fior young 
poults. This is especially true where he has had the great 
experience that he has had in the turkey business. 
In the case of Landers & Co. v. Fallows, et al., 81 Utah 
432, the court took up this particular subject and stated 
as follows: 
"* * * Moreover, there is no warranty of fitness where 
the buyer orders a specific article for a specific pur-
pose known to the Seller. Davenport Ladder Com-
pany vs. Hines Lumber Company, (C.C.A.) 43 F2d 
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63, Sturtevant Company vs. LeMar's Gas Company, 
188 Iowa 584, 176 N.W. 338." * * * * "Where goods 
are sold on inspection, there is no standard but iden-
tity, and no warranty implied orther than that the iden-
tical goods sold, and no others, shall be delivered. 5·5 
C.J. 717, Sec. 704; Downey v. Price Chemical Co., 204 
Ky. 98, 263 S.W. 690. And in such ease, the buyer 
must protect himself by a special, or promissory, war-
ranty against known or visible defects; which would 
naturally be the seller's agreement to repair them, so 
that the machine will do good work." 
The above citations are permitted on the question of 
the suitability of the particular augeT feeder units for the 
purpose required by the defendant. There is no claim 
whatever by the defendant that the goods received, to~wit: 
the auger feeder unit, did not comply, at least in form and 
shape, to the sample he saw. Under those circumstances 
there ean be no implied warranty that as far as the shape 
and construction of the goods are coocerned, that they 
were not suitable for his purpose. 
In adition to the fact that the auger feeder unit was 
sold by sample and inspection, thereby precluding an im-
pJied warranty under Title 60-1-15 Sub. Sec. 3, the war-
ranty would also be unavailable by reason of Title 60-1-15 
and 60-1-15 Sub. Sec. 1. These provisions are as follows: 
"Implied warranties of quality-Subject to the provi-
sions of this title and of any statute in that behalf, 
there is no implied warranty or condition as to the 
quality or fitness for any particular pwpose of goods 
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as 
follows: (1) Where the buyer, e~ressly or by im· 
pli!cation, makes known to the seller the particular 
purpose for which goods are required, and it appears 
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that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment 
(emphasis added) (whether he is the grower or man-
ufacturer or nort), there is an implied warranty that 
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. 
It is plain, therefore, that in order for an implied war-
ranty to arise under these provisions, that the buyer must 
rely on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting the goods 
for the particular purpose as stated to him by the buyer. 
A summary of the law concerning the necessity of the 
buye,r' s reliance in general and of his reliance in this type 
of sale is as follows: 
"Extent and Qualifications of Gene1ral Rule as to War-
ranty of Fitness; ReUance upon Seller's Judgment, 
Skill, or Experience - As a general rule, notwith-
standing goods are sold for a particular use, if the 
buyer himself understands what he wants and has a 
full opportunity to acquire a knowledge of any fact 
necessary to enable him to form a correct e~stimate, 
and selects such goods as he deems adapted to the 
intended use, there is no warranty of their fitness for 
such use. The existence or nonexistence of an im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 
must, and necessarily does, depend upon whether the 
buyer relied upon the skill or judgment of the seller, 
and this is a question of fact which is oniinarily to 
be determined by a jury under appropriate instruc-
tions." 46 Am. Jur. 532, Sec. 348. 
"In Sale of Machinery-The existence of an implied 
warranty of fitness by a manufacturer or seHer of 
machinery depends upon the same considern.tions which 
govern the existence of a warranty of fitness gener-
ally. The first inquiry is whether the purdtaser un-
der all the circumstances may be deemed to have de-
pended on the judgment, skill, or e::qlerimce of the 
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seller, a supposition that cannot exist where the pur-
chaser makes the selection or orders a known and 
described article of machinery, or specifies certain 
qualities or -characteristics, even though he also dis-
closes the purpose for which he intends to use it." 
46 Am. Jur. 534, Sec. 349. 
Under the circumstances of this case, where Wilson, 
a turkey grower with vast experience, with ample oppor-
tunity to gain a full knowledge of the auger feeder, and 
indeed where he made his own selection for his own pur-
poses, it would seem inconceivable that any reliance was 
placed on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting the 
goods purchased. 
This brings us to the next point in respect to the 
warranty, ·and that is whethe~r the auger units would, in 
fact, convey feed for 400 feet, as required by his coop 
construction. This is a more difficult question. This 
question, however, is not related to implied warranty, but 
is related to ~ress warranty. At this stage of the ar-
gument it must be admitted that there cannot be implied 
warranty of the auger feeder units in this regard and if 
the defendant has any case at all, it must rest on express 
warranty concerning 1Jhe ability of the auger feeder units 
to convey feed for 400 feet in the coop. 
It is Mr. Wilson's contention 1Jhat he explained to 
Mr. Tuttle that the feeder units would be 400 feet long 
and Mr. Tuttle assured him that the auger would convey 
feed for that distance. The evidence is in dispute as to 
whether Jamesway eventually got the one feeder unit 
that was installed working so that it did convey feed for 
that distance. The plaintiff contends that Mr. Persig and 
the engineer had the machine operating satisfactorilY 
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when they returned to California, but Mr. Wilson testi-
fies that it never did operate satisfactorily and the great-
est distance it would convey after they had repaired it 
was that it would convey feed two-.thirds of the way down 
(Tr. 22, Line 1). Regardless of that circumstance Mr. 
Wilson elected, whe1Jher for reason that the auger units 
would not convey 400 feet or because the trough con-
struction was unsuitable for young poults, to remove the 
one 400 feet unit installed and place that in the yard for 
the purpose of feeding turkeys of a more mature age of 
approximately eight weeks. He broke the units into eight 
units (Tr. P. 47 and 48). He states in his deposition that 
these units were installed in two hundred foot sections 
and that he bought seven additional bins to add to the 
one that he already had so that he had eight feeding 
units (Tr. P. 33). It would be difficult to see how the 
800 feet of auger feeder units purchased from J amesway 
could be broken into eight 200 foot feeders, however, the 
fact remains that these auger feeder units were installed 
in the yard and actually operated there from March of 
1958 until the present time. No complaint was ever reg-
istered with J amesway concerning these auger feeders in 
all of the correspondence to J:ames Manufacturing Com-
pany until the questioned Exhibit 8 (See Exhibits). The 
testimony concerning the operation of these auger feeder 
units in the yard is as follows: (Tr. P. 28, L. 7 through 
L. 13; Tr. P. 52, L. 15 through L. 20). 
Q. What I want to know, did you offer to re-
turn it to James Way? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. What did you do with it? 
A. I took it out in the field and installed it in 
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200 foot sections which we were able to manage rea-
sonably well. 
MR. HOW AR\D: I'm asking-I'm on Page 28 
Question 6 talking about these feeders. "Q·. Did 
you make a claim to the James Way Manufacturing 
Company for loss of your turkeys because of this 
defective equipment? A. Did I? Q. Yes. A. No, 
I was trying to get along with James Way Manufac-
turing Company." That's true, isn't it? 
Borth in his deposition and in the trial he stated that 
he had never made any eomplaint to James Manufac-
turing Company concerning these turkey feeders because 
he was trying to get along with them. The fact is that 
after he discovered the alleged defect in the turkey feed-
ers he purchased 75 additional range feeders of a differ-
ent colllStruetion from James Manufacturing Company. 
The evidence is also replete with correspondence concern-
ing James Manufacturing Company's efforts to get him 
to pay fhr the latter turkey feeders which he had pur-
chased from them. In none of this correspondence is any 
claim made that the auger turkey feeders were not work-
ing satisfactorily or that he wanted any adjustment on 
them. At the trial of the case Mr. Wilson produces a 
lett&, which has been marked as defendant's Emibit 8 
for introduction. Objection was made to the introduc-
tion o!f this exhibit on the basis that it was a copy of a 
purported letter supposedly written to the plaintiff, and 
that no effort had been made by the defendant to obtam 
the original ,oor;oce the introduction of this exhibit, nor 
was there any evidence offered that the original was in 
existence; that the plaintiff had ever received it or seen 
it before; or, in fact, that it was mailed. The plaintiff 
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had taken the deposition of the defendant and had in-
quired specifically whether defendant daimed a notice 
to the plaintiff in writing. In his deposition the defend-
ant answered and said: (Dp. P. 28, L. 14 th~ough L. 27). 
Q. Did you make any claim to the Jamesway 
Manufacturing Company for the loss of your turkeys 
because of this defective equipment? 
A. Did I? 
Q. Yes? 
A. No, I was trying to get along with James 
Manufacturing Company. 
Q. You weren't upset about it? 
A. I was quite upset about i.Jt. 
Q. The fact is you bought other equipment after 
that? 
A. Yes, I bought it from Jarnes.way. 
Q. You say you bought it f~om Jarnesway? 
A. Yes. 
In addition to this, the plaintiff served. upon the de-
fendant Interrogatories: 
"8. State whether the automatic feeders referred to 
in the second count of the counterclaim were used 
subsequent to discovery of their defectiveness." 
"A. Yes. These feeders were used at a later date 
in the field with larger turkeys, after we had modi-
fied them and shortened them to 200 feet so that we 
could operate them at all." 
"9. If the defendant made objections or protests to 
the plaintiff, state to whom and where such protests 
were made in respect to (a) 8, 26" ceiling :fans with 
thermostats andK-D Stimaline ventilators; (b) the auto-
matic feeders referred to in the second cOWlt of de-
fendant's counterclaim." 
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"A. I objected on several occasions, first in reporti:J 
that the equipment didn't work and again very for 
ibly at the time the representative from Californ 
came to my coop to experiment with the short aug 
and try the feed to trave1l the whole distance." 
"10. In respect to paragraphs 8 and 9 above, if p~ 
test or claim for damages were made in writing a 
tach a copy of such claims or protest.'' 
"A. Protests were made verbally in person." (En 
phasis added) 
Defendant served interrogatories upon the plainti 
requiring the plaintiff to furnish to the defendant copiE 
of all correspondence sent or received. Copies of such COl 
respondence as could be readily located were delivered 1 
the defendant in response to that interrogatory. (Se 
Interrogatories No. 20 and 21 of the defoodanrt). Th 
production of defendant's Exhibit 8 was a complete sw 
prise, for which the plaintiff had no opportunity to rebt 
or to produce teSiti.mony in contradiction thereof. If dE 
fendant had in mind ·that this document was to be intr< 
duced, then it was incumbent upon him to submit deman 
for admission of its authenticity under Rule 36. In th 
alternative, the defendant could have required us to pre 
duce the original under Rule 34, had he let us know tha 
there was a copy in existence. The defendant introduce 
Exhibit 8 for the purpose of showing notice of breach <J 
warranty, which was a material aspect of his case. PJ 
orf his an·SIWers to his depositions and interrogatories lur~ 
the plaintiff into believing there was nothing to be intro 
duced or testified to in respect to breach of warranty ex 
cept oral conversations between the defendant and em 
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ployees of the plaintiff. Nort only was the introduction 
of this document a surprise, but has the aspect of entrap-
ment, because the plaintiff had made every effort to dis-
cover the evidence the defendant had available for pro-
duction concerning notice of breach of warranty. 
One might think that because of the imperfect qual-
ity of the letter that Mr. Wilson decided not to mail it. 
The court will note that the last paragraph is illegible. 
There may be many explanati01ns 01ther than the mailing 
and receipt of this letter. The admission into evidence 
of this copy is prejudicial and error O!l1 the part of the 
court. Authorities in support of the plaintiff's conten-
tion are as follows: 
VanLeeuwen vs. Huffaker, 78 Uttah 521, 5 P2d 714: 
The VanLeeuwen case involves a situation where the 
plaintiff was the assignee of a real estate broker's fee. 
The defendant and another person were brought toget~her 
by the real estate agent, however, before the contract 
was reduced to finality, the defendant and the other per-
son got together and prepared a cO!l1tract away from the 
presence of the real estate broker. Later, both the de-
fendant and the other party told the broker that the coo-
tract had been prepared by an attorney and that irt pro-
vided for the payment of the real estate broker's fee. The 
plaintiff called the real estate broker to testify as rtJo the 
contents of the contract. Objection was made to his tes-
timony concerning the contents of the contract on the 
basis that no foundation had been laid for permitting sec-
ondary evidence of the contents of the contract. Notice 
to produce the original of the contract was given at a 
former trial. The court held that the previous notice 
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was sufficient for the second trial. However, the cot 
went on to say, in regards to the objection, that: 
"A reading of the transcript shows that the trial cou 
in ruling upon the objection, had in mind oruy t 
question of whether or not notice to produce whi~ 
was served prior to the first trial was sufficient 
entitle plaintiff to prove the contents of the contra 
by secondary evidence; :and the court being of opi 
ion that such norUce was sufficient, overruled the o 
jection .... But the defendant's objection WeJ 
farther than that. The objection on t:he ground ~ 
incompetency raised another question which the oou 
seemingly did not consider. As the record stoo 
plaintiff had not made any showing which would e1 
title him to introduce secondary evidence of the COl 
tents of the written contract. fie had not shown ft 
original was lost or destroyed, or that the origini 
was in the possession of defendant . . . . Theref<m 
the court was in error when it overruled the obje( 
tion." 
Another Utah case on the subject is the case of La1 
sen et al v. Ryan, et ·al., 54 U. 250, 180 P. 178. It wa 
contended in that case that the court erred in admittin 
in evidence a copy of the execution under which the prot 
erty was taken by the sheriff. Undoubtedly the sherii 
could have produced the original execution, oc if that wa 
lost or destroyed, then to have it restored according t 
the wen established rules of law procedure. The cour1 
hQWever-, admitted the copy in evidence without follow 
ing tlhe usual procedure in admitting secondary evidenc 
orf a lost document. In doing that the court erred. 
In the case of Wilson vs. Davis, et al, 103 P.2d 149 
the plaintiff was attempting to testify to the oonten1s o 
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certain deeds. The record discloses that the plaintiff had 
made a demand for the production of these deeds prior 
to trial. The deeds were not produced. On that basis 
she was attempting to testify as to their contents. The 
court held, concerning the objection raised by the defend-
ant that her testimony was nort the best evidence and 
that no proper foundation was laid for the introduction 
of her testimony, as follows: 
"Here there was no proof of the loss or destruction 
of the deed . . . . so as to permit other evidence of 
the contents. And obvioiU!Sly, under Section 10516, 
no demand upon Mr. Poore to produce them at trial 
in May, 1938, can be effectual as a foundation for 
such evidence until it has firsrt been shown by evi-
dence that " 'the original is in the possession' " of 
Mr. Poore." 
Cases concerning this problem that are analogous 
are as follows: 
Ancrum vs. State Highway Dept., 161 SE 98. In this 
case the plaintiff brought an action based on the negli-
gent maintenance of a road after a washout. He tried 
to prove the filing of claims by intDoducting copies there-
of at the trial. Objection was made that tJhe ·oopies were 
not the best evidence. Notice was not given to the de-
fendant to introduce the originals until the time of trial. 
The court held that that was not sufficient time f1or the 
defendant to comply with the notice, especially where the 
office of the defendant was thirty-two miles from the 
trial site and that the notice for the production of this 
document was not reasonable. A fortiori, in this case 
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the offiee of the defendant was 2,000 miles from the pi~ 
of trial. 
Ciccone v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 
164 A. 444. 
In this case suit was brought upon a life insuram 
poJicy issued by the defendant on the life of the plaintiff 
deceased husband. The insurance eompany defended c 
the basis of lapse of the poHcy by failure to pay the pD 
mium. The defendant sought to offer a oopy of the lap 
notice sent to the plaintiff's husband. Objection was su: 
tained to its admittance by the trial oourt and this ol 
jection was appealed by the defendant. The Sup:rem 
Court said demand for the original made at the time < 
the trial was not timely and that the objection shouJ 
have been sustained. The language of the ·court is as fo 
lo!WS: 
"The rule is that notice given or demand made durin 
the trial is not sufficient if the paper is not show 
to be in court or readily procurable by the party wh 
is supposed to have it, unless the party denies the~ 
istence of the paper, or that it is in his possession <J 
under his control." 
POINT IV 
THE OOURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRAN 
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THl 
CDOSE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CASE IN CHIE] 
AND IN FAILING TO GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'; 
MOrriON FOR A DIRECTED VERDier . 
Plaintiff has cited sufficient reasons in its argumeiJ 
to Point III above concerning the auger feeders to jill 
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tify deleting that portion of the defendant's cause of ac-
tion as an issue to be submitted to the jury. 
Although the appellant believes that without Exhibit 
D-8 in evidence ·the defendant has made no showing of 
notice of breach of warranty, nevertheless, it is the ap-
pellant's contention that the notice (Exhibit D-8) and 
all oral statements of the derfendant are derfeotive as no-
tice of breach of warranty because (1) they were not 
timely given and (2) they were inadequate to constitute 
notice of breach of warranty. 
Taking up the question of warranty in respect to the 
ventilator system, the appellant respeetfully urges that 
there was no basis upon which this matter could have 
been submitted to the jury under any circumstances in 
light of the defendant's testimony and in light of 1:Jhe ex-
hibits offered. In this case the defendant used the said 
equipment from February, 1958, until April of 195-9, 
and if his testimony is believed, had thousands of young 
turkeys die because of ill effects of the ventilating sys-
tem. At no time from January 8, 1958, when he pur-
chased these ventilators and fans t10 April 12, 1959 (see 
correspondence - Exhibits) did he make any claim of 
breach of warranty or that the system was not operating 
properly. His notice of alleged breach of warranty is this 
disputed letter of April 12, 1959, shown as Emibit D-8. 
It is the contention of the plaintiff that this emibit is 
not admissible for the reasons set forth in the argu~t 
to Point m above, but in addition to that the notice given 
was far from timely. It seems unbelievable that a person 
would have lost upwards of 30,000 young poults without 
discovering the cause of it. The evidence and testimony 
was that Mr. Wilson pla·ced in the coop three different 
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broods for the years 1958 and 1959, the last brood beiJ 
in the Spring of 1959, before he discovered that there w 
an unusual draft in the coop that caused the deaths, 
his opinion, complained of. Plaintiff offered substanti 
evidence that the turkey poults died of causes other th~ 
draft and Dr. Royal Bagley testified concerning the numb 
of poults that died from various bacterial causes. R 
gardless of causation, :however, it is the belief of the plai 
tiff that no proper notice of breach of warranty was give 
either orally, by the letter of April 12, 1959, or in a time: 
manner. Taking the letter of April 12, 1959, at fa< 
value, it is the position of the plaintiff that this does n< 
constitute a notice of breach of warranty within the meru 
ing of Utah Code Annotated 60-3-9, set forth as follows: 
"Acceptance does not bar action for damages-In th 
absence of express or implied agreement of the pa1 
ties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall n( 
discharge the seller from liability in damages, or ott 
er legal remedy for breach olf any promise oc wru 
ranty in the contract to sell or the sale. Burt if, afte 
acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notic 
to the seller of the breach of 'allY promise or wru 
ranty within a reasonable time after the buyer know! 
or ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall TI{] 
be liable therefor." 
"Statutory Requirement of Notice-In practically e\i 
ery jurisdiction the provisions of the state statut 
requiring notice of breach of warranty are the sam 
as Sec. 49 of the Uniform Act. The courts uniforml: 
hoJd under such statutory provisions requiring n<J 
tice of breach of warranty "within a reasonable tim 
after the buyer knows or ought to know of sud 
breach," that as a prerequisite to a recovery for : 
breach of warranty, the purchaser must give notio 
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to the seller of such breach within a reasonable time 
after he knew or under the circwnstances should 
have known of the breach. The notice required by 
Sec. 49 of the Uniform Sales A!ct is a notice given 
within such time as a notice would be given by an 
ordinarily careful man, acting under the same cir-
cumstances and with respect to goods of the same 
character. The purpose of the provision requiring 
such a notice is clearly to give the seller timely in-
formation thart the buyer proposes to look to him for 
damages for the breach, so that the former may 
govern his conduct accordingly.'' 
46 Am. Jur. 438, Sec. 257. 
"In the absenoe of a contractual provision for notice, 
it has been held or recognized that notice must be 
given by the buyer of goods to enable him rto recover 
damages for the seller's breach of an expressed war-
ranty, it must be given promptly or within a reason-
able time." 41 A.L.R. 2d 817." 
There are numerous cases supporting the gen&al 
statement in A.L.R. set forth above. 
In the case of Mawhinney vs. Jensen (Utah) 232 
P.2d 769, an action was brought based upon breach of 
warranty as to the quantity of personal property sold un-
der the contract. The court held: 
"A survey of the cases on this matter shows that 
timely notice is a vital condition precedent to an ac-
tion for breach of warranty ,Esbeco Distilling Cwp. 
v. Owings Mills Distillery, D.C., 43 F.Supp. 380; Pearl 
v. William Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass. 5·29, 58 N.E. 
2d 825; Bawn v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 162 P.2d 
801. Thirty-two months is, in law, an unreasonable 
delay lUlder the circwnstances of this case. Bar-
burger v. Stem Bros., Sup., 189 N.Y.S. 74; Stewart 
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v. B.R. Menzel & Co., 181 Minn. 347, 232 N.W. 522. 
The statute insists on notice within a reasonable time, 
but laches in equity only arise when the delay has 
caused prejudicial injury. Therefore the passage of 
time in and orf itseU bars the breach of warranty ac-
tion, but nort the remedy of reformation. In the in-
stant ease it is impossible to believe that the plain-
tiffs did not discover, long before 32 months had 
elapsed, that a couch, a stoker, dishes, sheets and 8 
steam radiatocs, etc., were missing. The complaint 
states that the defectiveness of the heating system 
was discovered two weeks after :the final contract was 
signed. The dumurrer was properly sustained on the 
two claims for breach of warranty. The case is re-
versed and remanded with directions to proceed in 
accordance with the views expressed herein. Costs 
awarded to appellant." 
.ks the language of the court indicates, it is impos-
sible 1JO believe, under the circumstances of the present 
case, that the defendant did not discover long ;before four-
teen months from the date of installation of the ventilator 
fans that they were defective or causing problems to his 
turkeys. And, therefore, have been under an obligation 
to notify plaintiff of 'Such defect. 
Not only was the notice not timely, but the plaintiff 
contends that notice, if given, was not adequate. Notice 
to be sufficient must at least inform ·the plaintiff or fairly 
advise him of the alleged defects, must be in such form 
as to dispel any inference that the defendant waived any 
defects, and it must fairly apprise the seller of the buy-
er's intention to look to him for damages because of the 
alleged breach. None of those requirements are present 
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Authorities as to what is an adequate notice are as foJ-
lows: 
Truslow and Fulle, Inc. vs. Diamond Bottling Corpo ... 
ration 151 Atlantic 492, 71 A.L.R. 1142. 
The court here interpreting Section 49 of the Uniform 
Sales Aot which is the same as 60-3-9 says as follows: 
"The purpose of the pro~sion requiring such a notice 
is clearly to give the seHer timely information that 
the buyer proposes to look to him fior damages for 
the breach, that the former may govern his conduct 
accordingly. Such notice need take no special form, 
but it must be such as fairly to apprise the seller of 
that intention (many citations). Where the question 
whether proper notice was given depends upon the 
construction of a written instrument, or the circum-
stances are such as to lead to only one reasonabl can-
elusion, it will be one of law; but wheTe the conclu-
sion involves the effect of various circumstances cap-
able of diverse interpretation, it is necessarily one 
of fact for the trier." 
In this case the defendant notified the plaintiff on nu-
merous occasions concerning defects of design of the 
bottle caps and at all times the plarintiff was aware of the 
defendant's losses because the defendant kept the plain-
tiff informed. The court held, however, that these com-
plaints were not sufficient notice that the defendant 
claimed a breach of warranty and its conduct was such 
that the plaintiff was not reasonaJbly i.nformed of the de-
fendant's intention to make such a claim. 
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The Court said: 
"We cannot say that they do. It is no doubt true, as 
Rugg, Chief Justice, said in Nashua River Paper Co. 
v. Linday, 242 Mass. 206, 210, 136 N.E. 358, that 
complaints as to the quality of goods furnished may 
be found to constitute a sufficient notice of a breach 
orf warranty. But that can be true only where the 
complaints under all the circumstances of the case 
are such as reasonably to apprise the seller that the 
buyer intends to daim damages for the breach." 
Aaron Bodek & Son vs. Aurach, et al. 146 Atlantic 
546. 
In this ease the plaintiff purchased a quantity of 
Army blankets from the defendant. After delivery to the 
plaintiff in April the blankets were sold by him. Within 
one month all the blankets were returned by his custo-
mers as not of the grade and quality represented. Plain· 
tiff waited until July and then called defendant and re-
quested that he come over and look at the blankets. De-
fendant refused to do so. Thereafter, plaintiff wrote de-
fendant a letter expressing his intention to sue for breach 
of contract. Two years later plaintiff instituted this ac· 
tion. In additio!Il! to finding that notice was not given 
within a reasonable time, the court had the following to 
say about the adequacy of notice given: 
"For another reason nortice did not meet the require 
ments orf the statute. The telephone conversation of 
July was not a notice that the blankets delivered were 
not in aocoroance with the contract. The only thing 
plaintiffs did was ask defendants to go and look at 
the blankets. There was no assertion that there was 
anything wrong with them, or if it was, it failed to 
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state any particulars. Neither does fue letter of Au-
gust 1st state in what respect there was a fiailure to 
deliver in accordance with the contract. 'Dhat let-
ter merely informs defendants that plaintiffs propose 
to bring suit for breach of oontract, without stating 
the nature of the breach. Plaintiffs buy goods; they 
deal with them as their own and ultimately sen them. 
They ought not to be heard to say that the goods 
were not those contracted for when they never, from 
the time of delivery down to the date of :tJhe filing of 
the statement of daim, over two years, informed de-
fendants in what respect there had been a breach of 
contract.'' 
"To this we may add that, where a vendee desires to 
avail himself of an alleged breach of warranty of 
quality in a sale of goods, he must, in giving notice 
of the breach, specify with some reasonaJble particu-
larity in what it oonsists." 
That is the situation in this case. Even if Mr. Wilson 
did complain that the auger feeders were defective, he 
moved them into the yard, utilized them fior a number of 
years, got the use and benefit out of them and never 
made and daim for damages until after a lawsuit was 
commenced on another purchase. The same is true in re-
spect to the ventilator fans. A mere complaint is not suf-
ficient notice of breach of warranty to give rise to a cause 
of action under 60-3-9. The plaintiff further contends that 
the burden of pleading and plloving notice is upon the de-
fendant. (See 71 A.L.R. 1150; 53 A.L.R. 2d 274; W. S. 
Maxwell Company vs. Southern Oregon Gas Company, 
158 Oregon 168, 74 P. 2d 594; 114 A.L.R. 697. 
Returning to the basic issue concerning this matter 
of sale, it is the further position of the plaintiff that no 
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sale was ever made by the plaintiff to the defendant upon 
which an action can be brought for breach of warranty. 
The eochlbits clearly show that the defendant purchased 
f:rom Utah Poultry from time to time, Jamesway products. 
Utah Poultry was a dealer in Jamesway products. Exhibit 
P.16 shows that on February 4th, a date midway between 
the purchase of the ventilator system and the auger feed-
ers, E. I. Wilson purchased from Utah Poultry and Farmers 
Co-op eighty Jamesway brooders and their attachments. 
The sale price of this item of $2,609.60. There never has 
been any contention that this J amesway equipment was 
sold to the defendant by Jamesway itself. The fact is that 
it was sold to the defendant by Utah Poultry. The de-
fendant admits that in December of 1957 he owed Utah 
Pou1try apprmdmately $200,000.00 for merchandise and 
poultry pliDchased through Utah Poultry. A summary of 
the law concerning the necessity of privity in this type 
of sale is as follows: 
"The fact a seller warrants the condition or quality 
of a thing sold does not itself, according to one view, 
impose any liability on him to third persons who are 
in no way parties to the contract. In such a case, 
there is no privirty of contract between the seller and 
such third persons, and ·this precludes any right on 
their part to any advantage or benefit to be derived 
from the warranty. There is authority to the effect 
that there can be no implied warranty without privity 
of contract, and it has been held that a manufacturer 
is not liable for breach of warranty to third persons 
who are strangers to the contract of manufacture or 
sale f01r the resulrts of any defects which may later 
develop in his product. 46 Am. Jur. 487, Sec. 306." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
The plaintiff will admit that there are cases to the 
contrary, however the prevailing view and the weight of 
authority is to the effect that there may be no recovery 
on the theory of breach of warranty against a manufac-
turer or seller of a product alleged to have caused injury 
where there is no privity of contract between the injured 
person and the defendant manufacturer or seller. Those 
cases hold that privity is indispensible to a successful 
warranty action. There are hundreds of cases cited in 
support of this rule in 75 A.L.R. 2d at Page 46 through 
Page 54. Utah has not, to tile extent of our research, 
adopted a rule on the subject. 
POINT V 
TIW; COURT MADE NUMEROUS ERRORS IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY. 
The court, in preparing its instructions, took the act-
ual pages submitted by the plaintiff and defendant, whieh 
were submitted on different forms of stationery and dif-
ferent type, and attempted to amalgamate them. In do-
ing so the court had occasion to strike certain provisions 
from the instructions submitted and to correct them by 
interlineation and ink markings and by the use of fur-
ther deletions to confirm with what the court felt was 
proper law. This manner of preparation of instructions 
could not help but cause confusion, duplication, and im-
proper emphasis to particular segments of the instruc-
tions. The appellant addresses itself to the following in-
structions: 
Instruction No. 11 is erroneous and in error ~or the 
following reasons: 
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The Court, in attempting to define proximate cause, 
is imposing upon a contract a tort principle. Proodmate 
cause is not involved in this case. The respondent's reme-
dies are defined under the Uniform Sales Aot, especially 
60-5-7 which provides remedies for breach of warranty. 
The Court, in its definition of proximate cause under In· 
struction No. 11, adopts the language of J.I.F.U. 15.6 
found on Page 49, except that the COurt has substituted 
"result" for the worn "injury" in J.I.F.U. instructions. 
Then to further complicate this instruction, the Court 
adds the alternative language at the top of Page 50, but 
substitutes, however, in lieu of "irt may operate directly 
or through intermediate agencies or through conditions 
created by such agencies", the words "it may opeTate di· 
rectly or by putting the intervening agencies in motion." 
This is strictly a tort instruction. The Court then turns 
to the language used in J.I.F.U. 15.7 concerning concur· 
ring negligence as proximate 1causes. 15.7 is set forth as 
follows: -: 
"The law does not necessarily recognize Olllly one prox· 
imate cause of an injury, 'COnsisting of only one fac· 
tor, one act, or the conduct of only one person. To 
the contrary, the acts and omissions of two or more 
persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause 
of an injury, an in such a case, each of the partici· 
pating acts or omissions is regarded in law as a proxi· 
mate cause and both may be held responsible." 
The Court then uses this language in its Instruction 
No. 11: 
"This does not mean that the law seeks recognizeS 
only ooe proximate cause of a result consisting of 
only ooe factor, one act, rme element of circumstance, 
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or the conduct of only one person. To the contrary, 
the acts and omissions of two or more persons may 
work concurrently as the efficient cause of a result, 
and in such a case each of he participating acts or 
omissions is regarded in law as a proximate cause. 
This is true regardless of the relative degree of the 
contribution; and where such concurrent conditions 
exist, it is no defense to say that one cause or con-
dition was more reSiponsible than another." 
The net result of this language was to cause the jury 
to believe that even though the turkeys died as a result 
of bacterial causes and over medication, which were soleJy 
attributable to the defendant, if one turkey died as a re-
sult of a draft or getting its head caught in the auger 
mechanism, or for some other reason that might be aJt-
tributable to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff would be re-
sponsible for all of the damage and loss sustained by the 
defendant. This type of conclusion would be entirely 
warranted under the Court's instructioo concerning prox-
imate cause and concurring causes. The Oourt, however, 
did not, in its application of tort principles to contract 
issues, instruct the jury as to contributocy cause, which 
would have been a necessary sequal. It would seem en-
tirely inappropriaJte to instruct coooerning proximate 
cause in a contract case without instructing concerning 
contributory causes, which, if the analogy is appropriate, 
would have eliminated any damage being assessed against 
the plaintiff for reason that birds obviously died as a re-
sult of the acts of the defendant. 
The appellant most emphatically urges the Court that 
this instruction is in error. 
The Court's Instructions No. 29 and 30 should have 
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been sufficient to inform the jury as to whart they should 
find, if they should find anything, for the defendant. Au-
thorities for the proposition that intervenin·g causes and 
contributing causes are only negligence doctrines are found 
in 38 Am. Jur. 721, Sec. 67 and 15 Am. Jur. 408, Sec. 18. 
Direct or proximate and remorte consequences are only 
negligence doctrine. 
Instruction No. 16 is erroneous for the Corurt merely 
instructed the jury as to what a warranty is by implica-
tion. The Court neglects to inforn1 the jury concerning 
the other provisions of 60-1-15 that would be properly 
applicabJe to this case, to-wit: Subsections 2 and 3. These 
provisions state as follows: 
" ( 2) Where the goods are bought by description 
from a selleT who deals in goods of that description 
(whether he is the grower or manufacturer or not), 
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be 
orf merchantable quality." 
" ( 3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is 
no implied warranty as regards defects which such 
examinaition ought to have revealed." 
Plaintiff requested the Court to give its Instruction 
No. 5 which would have completely and adequately sup-
plied the deficiency that is had in the Court's Instruction 
No. 16. The law clearly states that there is no implied 
warranty in a situation where there is an express war· 
ranty co~ering operational features and that an implied 
warranty exists only where an express warranty is not 
one concerning the quality or functionability of rthe mer· 
chandise. Where the buyer has ihad the opportunity to 
to inspect the commodity and the seller is guilty of no 
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fraud, there can be no implied warranty of merchant-
ability and the buyer takes the goods as he finds them; 
provided that the goods he receives are those of the same 
type and quality as that which he inspected prior to the 
sale. (Sre 46 Am. Jur. 525, Sec. 342). 
Instruction No. 18 is erroneous because it is unneces-
sary. The Court here is informing the jucy what may or 
may not be concerning the financial arrangement. This 
instruction is to the effect that the ci11cumstance could 
be as the defendant states it, looding credooce to a situ-
ation that is unsupported by evidence. Because it is not 
an instruction as to the law on the matter, it is an intru-
sion by the Court into the prerogatives of the jury. 
Instruction No. 33, Verdict F1orm A and B. From 
the instruction of the Court and ~rom ,the Verdict Forms 
A and B, it is impossible for the jury to find foc the de-
fendant on one cause of action and not for him on anorther 
cause of action. The instruotiO!ll and the verdict forms 
are such that the jury must merge its findings on the first 
and second cause of action, to-wit: the vootilator system 
and the auger feeder systems. It is impossible to tell from 
the verdict form Whether they found for or against the 
plaintiff in respect to either of the said ~causes of action, 
which are separate transactions. The forms are couched 
in such a way that the jury ;could reasonably believe that 
they had to find either for or against the plaintiff on both 
causes. Instruction No. 33 is also erroneous. 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL. 
The plaintiff made a timely motion for a new trial 
in writing (R. 84.), tile principal basis of the motion being 
newly discovered evidence material for the plaintiff, which 
the plaintiff could not, with reasonable diligence, have dis-
covered and produced at the trial. Attached to the plaintiff's 
martian were affidavits (R. 86, R. 87, R. 88, R. 89, R. 90, R. 
91, R. 92, R. 93, R. 94, R. 95, R. 96, R. 97, R. 98). That on 
the very last day of the trial, shortly before the matteT was 
sUJbmi:tted to the jucy, the plaintiff was informed by one of 
the plaintiff's witnesses that there had been a water prob-
lem that killed many of the turkeys. This matter came 
as a complete surprise to the plaintiff and at a time when 
the plaintiff had no opportunity to adequately prepare con-
cerning rthe source of water supply. An effort was made, 
during the trial of the matte·r, to secure witnesses concern· 
ing the water problem, ·and the plaintiff attempted to se-
cure these witnesses by subpoena. A request was made 
for a continuance, after the defendant had rested and be-
fore rebuttal testimony was had, and the Court allowed 
the plaintiff a few minutes in which to obtain the neces-
sary witnesses. Unfortunately, the plaintiff was not a:ble 
to olbtadn witnesses necessary to establish the facts con· 
tained in the affidavits attached to its motion for a new 
trial. The affidavits of Dr. Lawrence Morris, Professor 
of Animal Husbandcy, the affidavit of Dr. Royal A. Bag· 
ley-, a Veterinary Surgeon and Bacteriologist, were to the 
effect that the water used by the defendant for his young 
turkey- porults would be of extreme harm to them, if not 
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fatal. Based upon the analysis examined and the mineral 
content of the said water, the water could be a substantial 
causal factor in the death of the poults, which were the 
subject of the lawsuit. To deny the plaintiff an opportun-
ity to establish by legal proof the derteriorrating effect of 
this water, was a gross injustice and an abuse of discretion. 
Counsel made every effort to supply the Court with com-
plete information concerning this newly discovered evi-
dence and the affidavits supplied to the court were per-
suasive and factual. The affidavits were of the highest 
caliber and of prroven reputartion. Their opinion concern-
ing the adverse effect o[ this water upon poults should 
have entitled the plaintiff to a new trial. This was a clas-
sic basis for granting of a new trial under Rule 59(a-4). 
The Court, in hearing the argument, cooceded that coun-
sel for the plaintiff had no opportunity to establish the 
evidence supplied in the affidavits attached. The reoorrd 
in the ease shows that the plaintiff was well prepared, e'x-
cept for a jury trial, and had utilized full and complete dis-
covery methods and had failed to discover this unusual and 
unexpected circumstance that expLains the loss complained 
of by the defendant on a ground that oompletely absolved 
plaintiff from liability. The Court's refusal to grant tJhe 
plaintiff a new trial is .clearly an abuse of discretion o[ 
great harm and prejudice to tlhe plaintiff. The plaintiff's 
efforts and sizeable expense in obtaining this information 
should not go unobserved and be unavailing in a situation 
wherein the law provides a 'remedy, to .. wit: Rule 59. 
The plaintiff sets forth other ground in its motion far 
a new trial, substantial parts of which have been argued 
above under the other counts of error. 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully urges this Court to firui 
that the judgment in favor of the defendant was errone()'W 
and without basis for the following reasons: 
1. There never was a sale from the plaintiff to the 
defendant. 
2. There was never a warranty expressed or implied. 
3. If there was a warranty, there was never notice 
given to the plaintiff in a timely and adequate manner. 
4. That defendant suffered no damage as a result of 
alleged breach of warranty concerning the auger feeder 
units. 
5. The errors committed by the Court in the admis-
sion of inadmissible evidence and the erroneous instruc· 
tion of the jury and the failure of the Court to allow the 
plaintiff a new trial in order to submit the evidence referred 
to in the affidavits which offer a reasonable and satisfac· 
tory explanation of the losses of the defendant, other than 
caused by the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD·, for 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
290 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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